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LEGITIMATE REASONS FOR FIRING: MUST
THEY HONESTLY BE REASONABLE?
Rebecca Michaels*
INTRODUCTION

Did Titlemen's management honestly believe that? Mary is a fortyfive year old woman who is disabled as a result of an accident she
suffered over twenty years ago. She has been employed at the
Titlemen company for over fifteen years. She is a very diligent worker
and believes that she is well-liked by both fellow employees and upper
management. Mary has worked as a saleswoman for the entire time
she has been employed at Titlemen and is responsible for selling
Titlemen's goods to private companies who in turn sell to consumers.
The salespeople are set up in teams of two, therefore Mary works
closely with one individual.
Mary's job is a very good job and her hours are conducive to the
kind of lifestyle she would like to lead. She works from 8:00 a.m. to
5:00 p.m. The only caveat is that Titlemen is inflexible in terms of
changing hours or employees showing up late to work. In recent
months, Mary's supervisors have expressed concern that Mary has
been arriving to work late and leaving early and that, as a result, her
productivity has suffered.
Before taking action, company managers conducted an
investigation. Mary's immediate supervisor reviewed her time sheets
and interviewed other employees about the matter, but she never
confronted Mary with the allegations nor did she interview Mary's
teammate. Eventually the company terminated Mary. Mary alleges
that she was not late for work and did not repeatedly leave early.
Eventually, Mary came to believe that the alleged lateness and leaving
early were not the real reasons she was fired. Instead, it perhaps was
her age, or her gender, or maybe her disability.
This Note analyzes the split among the circuit courts regarding
whether an employer's belief in its legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason for firing an employee must simply be honest or must also be
reasonable. Determination of the issue is crucial for both employers
and employees so that they can better understand what types of
* J.D. Candidate, 2004, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank
Professor Terry Smith for his insightful suggestions and comments.
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evidence they will need to offer in a discrimination suit. This
determination is particularly crucial for employers to determine how
much judicial scrutiny their practices and decisions must endure. Part
I of this Note introduces the discrimination laws relevant to this area:
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with
Disabilities Act, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.
Part I also discusses the requirements for a plaintiff to make a case of
discrimination and discusses the use of pretext and the honest belief
rule. Part II discusses the split among circuits regarding whether an
employer's belief in its legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the
firing decision must simply be honestly held or must also be
objectively reasonable. Part III of this Note advocates adoption of the
honest belief rule without a requirement of reasonableness and
discusses the policy rationales for this proposal.
I. THE DISCRIMINATION LAWS AND THEIR APPLICATION

Congressional regulation of discrimination in employment is a
relatively new phenomenon and has modified the employee-employer
relationship, which traditionally has been held to be at will.1 Under
the employment at will regime, the employer and employee both have
equal rights to terminate the employment relationship for any reason.2
This regime fell into disfavor with the onset of the civil rights
movements of the 1960s.' Though the at will regime still exists, it is
limited by congressional anti-discrimination legislation.' Congress
1. See Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A
HistoricalReview and CriticalAssessment, 43 B.C. L. Rev. 351, 354 (2002). Generally,
before The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted, if employees were not protected by
unions or some form of labor law, they held their jobs at will. They did not have a
contract for employment and they could be terminated for any reason the employer
deemed necessary. By the same token, employees could end the employment
relationship for any reason they felt necessary. Thus, both the employer and
employee were in equal positions. This view is premised on the economic view that
predominated, namely, freedom of contract under a market rule regime. Id. at 356-57.
2. Id. at 356.
3. Michael Gold, An Introduction to the Law of Employment Discrimination
(2001).
The importance of the law against employment discrimination remains as
strong as ever. America is called the land of opportunity, but for the first
350 years of our history we denied equality of opportunity to most of our
citizens.... Then a sea change occurred.... America began to fulfill its
promise.
The fulfillment began in 1957 when Rosa Parks refused to move to the
back of a bus one afternoon in Montgomery, Alabama.
Id. at xi.
4. The 1960s were not the first time that there was an attempt to eradicate
discrimination. The Reconstruction era civil rights statutes were enacted in the
nineteenth century to prohibit many types of discrimination, but they generally were
not utilized in employment until after the civil rights movements of the twentieth
century and the passage of Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985 (2000); Abigail
Cooley Modjeska, Employment Discrimination Law § 1.01 (3d. ed. 2002); see also
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began to regulate employment relationships in the 1960s with the
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, specifically, Title VII ("Title
VII").5 Congress then expanded the protection afforded employees
with the passage of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
("ADEA"),6 adopted in 1967, and the Americans with Disabilities
Act ("ADA"), which became law in 1990. 7 Individual states also
regulate discrimination in different forms and in some instances afford
more protection to individuals than do the federal statutesi
While the passage of the discrimination laws has marked great
achievement and promise, it is not clear that employers and the Court
have favorably received the laws. 9 There has been some effort to
James E. Macdonald & Caryn L. Beck-Dudley, A Natural Law Defense to the
Employment Law Question: A Response to Richard Epstein, 38 Am. Bus. L.J. 363, 373
(2001) (reasoning that the reconstruction laws failed because of the enactment of the
Jim Crow legislation of the South which imposed a barrier for African Americans).
Currently, § 1981 is used to prohibit racial discrimination. In Saint FrancisCollege v.
Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987), the Court's definition of race under § 1981
differed from what is thought of as the common scientific definition of race. Under §
1981, "race" includes ancestry and ethnic characteristics.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 621-634 (2000).
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000). Congress has also adopted specific statutes
with the purpose of mandating that employers take certain specific action in
employment such as offering temporary leave and adherence to safety standards. See
The Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2000) (requiring
employers to comply with occupational health and safety standards); The Family and
Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2000) (requiring employers to allow
employees to take up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave to care for a child or a family
member with a serious health condition). See Befort, supra note 1, for a discussion of
employment discrimination statutes.
8. Mack A. Player, Federal Law of Employment Discrimination § 11-4.01 (1999).
For example, some states provide protection against discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation, pregnancy or marital status. ld; see, e.g., Cal. Fed. Sav. and Loan
Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 290-91 (1987) (complying with both the federal law-in
this case, Title VII-and California state law is not an impossibility, thus the state law
is valid). The Court held in Guerra that although Title VII did not allow for
preferential treatment for pregnant women the California state law that allowed
women to be reinstated after pregnancy disability leave could be applied in addition
to Title VII. The state law, therefore, was constitutional. Id. Of course, the law
subjected California to suits by non-pregnant individuals who required disability
leave, but were not afforded automatic reinstatement. Thus, the reasonable solution
would be that if protections are afforded to one, they should be given to all. New
York has recently enacted legislation to protect the civil liberties of homosexuals. See
Shaila K. Dewan, Pataki Signs Law Protecting Rights of Gays, N.Y. Times, Dec. 18,
2002, at Al.
9. Harold S. Lewis, Jr. & Elizabeth J. Norman, Employment Discrimination Law
and Practice § 1.1 (2001) ("The predominant theme in the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence has been the impulse to free employers from the dread hand of
government regulation. Thus more than half the judicial life of this landmark
legislation has been devoted primarily to restriction, retrenchment, and restoration of
traditional management prerogatives." (internal citation omitted)); see also Ronald
Turner, Thirty Years of Title VII's Regulatory Regime: Rights, Theories, and Realities,
46 Ala. L. Rev. 375, 479-81 (1995) (noting that Title VII initially had a significant
impact to rid society of egregious discrimination, but in reality probably does little
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modify this result, particularly with the passage of the Civil Rights Act
of 1991; however, the Act's success is not clear."' The discrimination
laws do not confer affirmative rights on employees. They allow an
employee, as a member of a particular protected group, the benefit of
not being discriminated against based on membership in that group.'
Regardless of the opinion on their success, the discrimination laws are
still a predominant force in American employment and guide relations
among employers and employees. 2 The next section highlights the
important elements of the discrimination laws: Title VII, the ADEA
and the ADA.

today to prevent the discrimination that exists); Editorial Desk, The Supreme Court
Docket; States" Rights vs. Civil Rights, N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 2003, at A28 ('[T]he
Rehnquist court's 5-to-4 conservative majority has been pushing for the better part of
a decade to limit Congress's power to pass anti-discrimination and health and safety
laws."). But see Daniel F. Piar, The Uncertain Future of Title VII Class Actions After
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 2001 BYU L. Rev. 305, 306 ("In the decades since 1964,
Title VII cases have become a staple of the federal court system and a prominent
means of addressing both real and perceived discrimination on the job.").
10. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2000). The Act codified the disparate impact theory of
discrimination and imposed limits on compensatory and punitive damages. See Sarah
Johnston, ADR in the Employment Discrimination Context: Friend or Foe to
Claimants,22 Hamline J.Pub. L. & Pol'y 335, 342 (2001) (noting that the Act made it
easier for victims to bring suit, increased possible monetary awards and broadened
the authority of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC")). But
see Julia B. Latham Worsham, Disparate Impact Lawsuits Under Title VI, Section 602:
Can a Legal Tool Build Environmental Justice?, 27 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 631, 68687 (2000) (noting that the Act proposed higher burdens for both plaintiff and
defendant).
11.According to one commentator,
IT~hese statutes provide protection to individuals not as workers, but as
members of a particular group or on the basis of a specified protected
trait .... [Ejven as to these protected classifications, employers are
prohibited only from acting in a discriminatory manner; they are not
required to act on the basis of some more expansive notion of fairness or
cause.
Befort, supra note 1, at 379-80. Befort theorizes that because of the protections
afforded by the anti-discrimination statutes, individuals expect more protection than
the statutory language actually grants. He says that, "Ibly prohibiting a certain subset
of unfair employment practices, these statutes create a climate in which expectations
of fair treatment are fostered even beyond the precise contours of statutory
coverage." Id. at 392.
12. For a discussion, see Lewis & Norman, supra note 9, at § 1.1. Some of the
criticism stems from Congress's failure to extend the laws to small employers, which
seemingly allows such small employers to discriminate without consequences, at least
on the federal level. However, race and ancestry discrimination are also prohibited
by 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which has no minimum employee requirement for the employer
to be subject to the statute. Id.
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A. Legislation
1. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641' applies to employers who
employ more than fifteen individuals.' 4 It prohibits an employer from
making an employment decision on the basis of an individual's race,
color, religion, sex 5 or national origin.' 6 Title VII is very broad and
prohibits discrimination in any aspect of employment. 7 A protected
individual can sue for alleged discrimination under Title VII with
respect to hiring and firing decisions, promotions, job assignments,
shift assignments and other areas of employment. 8 Although the

13. It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2) (2000).
14. Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH), 1 207 (2002) [hereinafter CCH]. Note that there
are strict filing requirements to institute a Title VII action. An individual must file
with the EEOC before bringing suit in district court. See, e.g., Ruben H. Arredondo,
Different Strokes for Different Folks: Balancing the Treatment of Employers and
Employees in Employment Discrimination Cases in Courts Within the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals, 16 BYU J. Pub. L. 261, 262 (2002). The Supreme Court has held
that such filing is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to sue in court, but is rather more
akin to a statute of limitations and as such may be subject to estoppel and equitable
tolling. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982).
15. The term "sex" also includes a prohibition of discrimination based on
pregnancy. See, e.g., Julie Manning Magid, Pregnantwith Possibility: Reexamining the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 38 Am. Bus. L.J. 819, 820 (2001); see infra note 19.
Title VII also prohibits sexual harassment. See Henry L. Chambers, Jr., (Un)Welcome
Conduct and the Sexually Hostile Environment, 53 Ala. L. Rev 733, 738-39 (2002).
16. See Gold, supra note 3, at 1. Interestingly, "national origin" does not refer to
one's citizenship, but instead refers to the country that one or one's forebears came
from. Id.
Thus, suppose Regina is not an American citizen, but she has permission to
work in this country. An employer would violate Title VII by refusing to
hire her because she or her ancestors were born in Mexico (her national
origin), but would not violate Title VII by refusing to hire her because she is
not an American citizen.
Id.
17. See Lewis & Norman, supra note 9, at § 2.1. Title VII applies to all "'terms,
conditions or privileges' of employment, a phrase the federal courts have construed
quite broadly to embrace any benefit actually conferred or burden actually imposed
in the workplace, whether or not provided for by contract." Id. (citations omitted).
18. Id.
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law's reach is expansive, 9 it was primarily enacted to protect African
Americans from discrimination.2
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 amended Title VII to change the
remedies for discrimination and codify the theory of disparate
impact. 2' Notably, an employer may violate Title VII without intent,
provided a practice has a disproportionate impact on a protected
group. 22 For instance, if an employer creates a hiring test and only
hires those who pass, that employer may be discriminating
unknowingly against certain protected groups, who consistently fail
the test at a higher rate than non-minority groups.23 Thus, the24
employer could be liable for discrimination under Title VII.
Disparate impact theory also applies to groups protected under the
ADA and most likely under the ADEA"
19. In theory, every individual is protected under Title VII because in some aspect
each person is a member of a protected group whether it just be the male-female
distinction under the term "sex." Nevertheless, it might be hard, but not impossible,
for a male to make a case of sex discrimination because there is no history of males
being a disadvantaged group. Also, not every group is protected under Title VII. For
instance, Title VII does not prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation,
though the term "sex" has been held to include sexual harassment and pregnancy
discrimination. See, e.g., Thomas R. Haggard, Understanding Employment
Discrimination 127 (2001) ("[D]iscrimination on the basis of sexual preference or
orientation remains beyond the scope of Title VII.... [Ajmendments to add sexual
orientation to Title VII's list of protected classes have consistently been rejected lby
Congress].").
20. See H.R. Rep. No. 88-914 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2393
("In various regions of the country there is discrimination against some minority
groups. Most glaring, however, is the discrimination against Negroes which exists
throughout our Nation."); S. Rep. No. 88-872 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2355, 2362 ("Each [major national political party] in 1960 committed itself to a
platform and a program of equal opportunity and elimination of racial
discrimination."); see also Robert Brookins, Mixed-Motives, Title VII, and Removing
Sexism from Employment: The Reality and the Rhetoric, 59 AIb. L. Rev. 1, 8-9 (1995)
(noting that including sex in Title VII was an afterthought).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b) (2000) (compensatory and punitive damages changes): 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (codification of disparate impact).
22. Disparate impact is present when
a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular
employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin and the respondent fails to
demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the position in
question and consistent with business necessity....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(i).
23. CCH, supra note 14,
253 ("Preemployment testing and educational
standards often create employment problems by having a disparate impact on racial
minorities who statistically ... fail the tests at a higher rate than non-minorit[ies].").
24. See supra notes 21-23 for a definition of disparate impact.
25. Keith R. Fentonmiller, The Continuing Validity of Disparate Impact Analysis
for Federal-Sector Age Discrimination Claims, 47 Am. U. L. Rev. 1071, 1081-83 (1998)
(noting that Congress has not provided for disparate impact in ADEA claims, but
many courts have applied the theory to cases under the ADEA, although some courts
refuse to do so): see also CCH, supra note 14, 1 253 (noting that disparate impact
applies to claims under the ADA, but it is unsettled whether it applies to claims under
the ADEA).

2003]

LEGITIMATE REASONS FOR FIRING

2649

2. Age Discrimination in Employment Act
The ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer to use age as a basis
for any employment decision.26 Unlike Title VII, the ADEA only
protects those individuals who are at least forty years old.27 Similarly
to Title VII, the ADEA does not require any preferential treatment
towards those over forty, but merely prohibits discrimination against
those individuals.28 In creating the law Congress "was prompted by its
concern that older workers were being deprived of employment on the
basis of inaccurate and stigmatizing stereotypes. '29 The ADEA
applies to private employers with twenty or more employees and to
most public employers, though not state employers.") An individual
26. The statute provides,
It shall be unlawful for an employer (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's age: or
(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with this
chapter.
29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2000).
27. An employer does not violate federal law by refusing to hire someone under
forty because they are too young, 29 U.S.C. § 631(a), though they might be in
violation of a state or local law. In New York, those eighteen or older are protected.
N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 (3-a)(a) (McKinney 2001). Note that there are certain
exceptions to the ADEA, including minimum ages of eligibility for retirement
benefits and seniority systems. 29 U.S.C. §§ 623 (k), (1). There are also mandatory
retirement exceptions for police and firefighters. 29 U.S.C. § 623(j).
28. See Lewis & Norman, supra note 9, § 7.1. See also supra note 7 for examples
where Congress has mandated action.
29. Haggard, supra note 19, at 221 (quoting Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggens, 507 U.S.
604, 610 (1993)); see H.R. Rep. No. 90-805 (1967), reprinted in '1967 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2213, 2214 ("Hundreds of thousands, not yet old, not yet voluntarily retired, find
themselves jobless because of arbitrary age discrimination." (citation omitted)).
However, it has been argued that increasing age is viewed as less of a social stigma
than the membership in a group protected under Title VII. See Lewis & Norman,
supra note 9, § 7.1. This is of course because of the very nature of the characteristic.
Everyone who survives past forty will become a member of the group protected,
while membership in the protected groups under Title VII is defined at birth and the
characteristics of membership are immutable. Additionally, it is generally accepted
that to some degree performance declines with advanced age, but such a statement
could not be made with respect to Title VII's protected groups. Id.
30. CCH, supra note 14,
211. The twenty employee requirement is more
stringent than the fifteen person requirement under Title VII and the ADA. The
Supreme Court has held that the ADEA does not apply to state employees or state
government positions, though it does apply to county and local employees. Kimel v.
Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 66-67 (2000); see also Evelyn Corwin McCafferty,
Comment, Age Discriminationand Sovereign Immunity: Does Kimel Signal the End
of the Line for Alabama's State Employees?, 52 Ala. L. Rev. 1057 (2001). However,
state employees subject to age discrimination can seek redress under state
employment discrimination statutes. Kimnel, 528 U.S. at 91.
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alleging discrimination under the ADEA need not show that a nonprotected individual, i.e., someone under forty, received the job or
promotion, for instance, but simply must create an inference that the
employer relied on age in its decision-making process.3 The Supreme
Court, however, has said that the greater the disparity in age between
the plaintiff and the individual chosen, the greater likelihood of
drawing an inference of discriminatory animus.32
3. Americans with Disabilities Act
The Americans with Disabilities Act 33 prohibits an employer from
using an employee's disability as the basis for an employment
decision. 34 The ADA requires an employer to provide reasonable
accommodations 35 for those with disabilities unless such
accommodation would result in undue hardship to the employer.36
The ADA covers those private employers with fifteen or more
employees and applies to city and county governments, but not state
31. O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 312 (1996).
32. Id. at 313 ("Because the ADEA prohibits discrimination on the basis of age
and not class membership, the fact that a replacement is substantially younger than
the plaintiff is a far more reliable indicator of age discrimination than is the fact that
the plaintiff was replaced by someone outside the protected class.").
33. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2000). The ADA provides that
No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a
disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job
application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees,
employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and
privileges of employment.
Id. § 12112(a).
The term discriminate is defined in the act to include
(A) not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or
mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who
is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that
the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of
the business of such covered entity; or
(B) denying employment opportunities to a job applicant or employee who
is an otherwise qualified individual with a disability, if such denial is based
on the need of such covered entity to make reasonable accommodation to
the physical or mental impairments of the employee or applicant ....
Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A), (B).
34. Id. § 12112(b).
35. Reasonable accommodations include modifications to the job application
process, work environment or those modifications which would allow a disabled
worker to enjoy the same benefits that other non-disabled workers enjoy. Id. §
12111(9). Even with modification, the employee must be able to perform the
essential functions of the job. Id. § 12111(8); see also Melody Kubo, Extraterritorial
Application of the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 2 Asian-Pac. L. & Pol'y J. 259, 264
(2001) (discussing generally the provision of Title I of the ADA, including reasonable
accommodations).
36. If a reasonable accommodation imposes an undue hardship on the employer,
the employer will not be required to make the accommodation. An undue hardship is
determined based on the facts of the case, cost, effects on other employees and effects
on the business. 42 U.S.C. § 1211 1(10)(B).
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or federal governments.37 One commentator boasts that "[s]ince its
enactment, the ADA has provided a powerful means to increase
workplace equality, promote social integration, and enhance the
fundamental dignity of people with disabilities. '3' The law protects
disabled, but nonetheless qualified, individuals who can perform the
essential functions of the job with or without reasonable
accommodation.3 9 One is considered disabled under the law if he or
she has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a
major life activity, has a record of impairment, or is regarded as
impaired.4" While the law marked a great advancement for disabled
individuals, ADA case law has proved disappointing. Studies show
that in over ninety percent of suits brought by disabled individuals,
the defendant prevails.4
B. The Supreme Court Treatment
The Supreme Court has developed a framework for burdens of
proof in a discrimination case premised on circumstantial evidence.42
37. See Gold, supra note 3, at 55. The ADA does not apply to the federal
government because the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994), applies
to the federal government and prohibits discrimination by the federal government,
Executive Agency or the United States Postal Service. It also requires the above to
take affirmative action to hire disabled individuals. Id. § 794. Similar to the Supreme
Court's decision concerning states being subject to the ADEA, the Court has held
that the ADA does not apply to the states based on federalism concerns. Bd. of Tr. of
Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001).
38. Paul Steven Miller, Introduction: The Evolving ADA, in Employment
Disability, and The Americans With Disabilities Act 3 (Peter David Blank ed., 2000);
see also 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a)(1), (7)(2000) (finding that there were over forty million
disabled individuals who have been "subjected to a history of purposeful unequal
treatment" which needed to be redressed).
39. Id. § 12111(8).
40. Id. § 12102(2). Pregnancy and simple physical characteristics such as eye color
or left-handedness are not covered under the Act. CCH, supra note 14, $ 214. It is
generally difficult to be classified as disabled within the meaning of the Act, thus
establishing that one is protected at all under the Act is a large aspect of a prima facie
case under the ADA. For a discussion, see Mark C. Weber, The Americans with
Disabilities Act and Employment: A Non-Retrospective, 52 Ala. L. Rev. 375, 377-85
(2000). This differs vastly from Title VII or the ADEA where membership in a
protected group is in many respects obvious or easily proven. Additionally, there are
no per se disabilities under the Act and each alleged disability should be analyzed by
the court to determine if it meets the definition. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 424 U.S.
624, 631 (1998) (utilizing the definition of a disability under the Act to determine if
the Respondent was disabled within the meaning of the Act and failing to classify an
HIV infection as a per se disability).
41. Lewis & Norman, supra note 9,§ 10.10.
42. This Note addresses the use of circumstantial evidence. When direct evidence
is used, the burden shifting framework set forth by the Supreme Court in McDonnell
Douglas, does not apply. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973);
see also discussion, infra Part II.A.
For case law about direct evidence of
discrimination, see, for example, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)
(finding that the sex stereotypes found in evaluation forms which were used to
delermine promotions were an example of direct evidence of discrimination). Direct
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A claim of disparate treatment 43 discrimination may rely on either
direct or circumstantial evidence. The key aspect of a disparate
treatment claim is intent by the employer to discriminate. 4 When a
plaintiff utilizes circumstantial evidence,4 5 courts employ the
framework articulated by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green46 and later refined in Texas Department of Community
Affairs v. Burdine.47 Though the test has been modified further in
subsequent cases, it still remains the rule in a discrimination case.

evidence is when plaintiff has unmistakable evidence of the employer's intent to
discriminate. Circumstantial evidence, on the other hand, is based on evidence which
allows an inference "that the falsity of a defendant's proffered reason for the
employment action at issue proves the defendant's bias," i.e., there is no clear or
direct evidence that the employer had intent, but based on the evidence as a whole
intent can be inferred. Joseph J. Ward, A Callfor Price Waterhouse 1I: The Legacy of
Justice O'Connor's Direct Evidence Requirement for Mixed-Motive Employment
Discrimination Claims, 61 AIb. L. Rev. 627, 637 (1997). Examples of circumstantial
evidence that might be used in a gender discrimination case may include employer
hostility towards one sex, comments about sex by managers, and evidence that less
qualified individuals of the opposite sex received the promotion.
43. Generally, employment discrimination claims are premised on one of two
theories: disparate treatment or disparate impact. Disparate treatment discrimination
requires an employer to intend to treat individuals that are members of a protected
group less favorably than others. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609
(1993). While intent or motive is an essential requirement, it can be inferred from
circumstantial evidence. Id. In a disparate impact case, there is no discriminatory
intent. Id. An employer's practices, which appear to be neutral, actually discriminate
against a protected group. Id. An employer can defend by proving that the practice
was a business necessity. Id. See also supra notes 21-23 for more information about
disparate impact.
44. See Hazen, 507 U.S. at 610 ("[L]iability depends on whether the protected
trait ... actually motivated the employer's decision.").
45. Circumstantial evidence can come in many forms and is usually more common
than a direct evidence discrimination case. Using indirect evidence became
the most common device by which Title VII plaintiffs proved discriminatory
grounds was based on circumstantial evidence alone. This was largely
because, by the 1980's, few U.S. employers had official policies excluding
women or minorities from particular classes of jobs, as had been the
widespread practice when Title VII was first enacted. Similarly, by the
1980's, most people had learned, whatever their private attitudes might be,
not to make statements indicative of racist, sexist, or otherwise prejudiced
attitudes. "Direct evidence" of bias was rarely available to plaintiffs in
employment discrimination cases.
Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Burdens of Equality: Burdens of Proof and
Presumptions in Indian and American Civil Rights Law, 47 Am. J. Comp. L. 89, 116
(1999).
46. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
47. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
48. See infra text accompanying notes 66-81; see also Kariotis v. Navistar Int'l
Transp. Corp, 131 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting the frequency of the use of the
test).
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1. The McDonnell Douglas/BurdineFramework
In McDonnell Douglas, Green, an African American male, was laid
off during a reduction in force.4" Green was a civil rights activist and
believed that "his discharge and the general hiring practices of
[McDonnell Douglas] were racially motivated." ''
He and others
protested McDonnell Douglas's hiring practices and the reduction in
force by illegally parking their cars on the main roads to McDonnell
Douglas's plant during rush hour, thus preventing access to the plant
for employees. 1 Green was arrested and pled guilty to obstructing
traffic.52 Almost a year later, McDonnell Douglas advertised for
qualified mechanics, and Green's application was denied based on his
participation in the stall-in. 3 Green brought suit under Title VII,
claiming racial discrimination and retaliation for his civil rights
activities, specifically his protesting of alleged unlawful employment
conditions. 4 The district court concluded that Green was lawfully not
re-hired because of his activities in an illegal stall-in, not for his civil
rights activities. 5 The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court." The
Supreme Court remanded the case for a determination of whether
Green satisfied his prima facie case and was able to show pretext in
accordance with the new burdens of proof established by the Court.57
The Court, in McDonnell Douglas, created a three-part burden
shifting test for intentional discrimination cases. The Court held that
49. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 794.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 794-95.
52. Id. at 795.
53. Id. at 796. Green also apparently participated in a lock-in at the McDonnell
Douglas facility prior to his seeking reemployment, but subsequent to the stall-in. At
the lock-in Green and others protested and chained the front door of an office
building where McDonnell Douglas employees worked. Green's activities at the lockin were also cited as reasons for his failure to obtain reemployment. Id. at 795 & n. 3.
54. Id. at 796.
55. Id. at 797. The court also dismissed Green's racial discrimination complaint
because the EEOC failed to make a determination on the issue. Id.
56. Id. at 797-98. The court determined that having an EEOC determination was
not a prerequisite to adjudicating a claim in federal court. The Supreme Court upheld
the Eighth Circuit's determination that absence of an EEOC finding of reasonable
cause does not bar suit in federal court. Therefore, the Court found that the racial
discrimination claim was not barred. Id. at 798-99.
57. Id. at 807.
58. The McDonnell Douglas framework arose from a Title VII discrimination
case, but has been applied to claims under the ADEA. See Jackson v. E.J. Brach
Corp., 176 F.3d 971, 982 (7th Cir. 1999) (utilizing the McDonnell Douglas framework
for an ADEA claim); Gustovich v. AT&T Communications, Inc., 972 F.2d 845 (7th
Cir. 1992) (employing the three prong burden shifting test). However, it is not as
clear under the ADA because claims under the ADA can take two forms. One claim
can be discrimination because of a disability in which the McDonnell Douglas
framework would clearly apply and the other claim is where an employer has failed to
provide reasonable accommodations to the disabled. In the latter, the courts
generally employ a different test. See Green v. Nat'l Steel Corp., 197 F.3d 894, 897-98
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a plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of
discrimination:
This may be done by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial minority;
(ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the
employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications,
he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position
remained open and the employer continued
to seek applicants from
59
persons of complainant's qualifications.
Once the plaintiff satisfies this initial burden, an "inference of illegal
intent arises." "' The purpose of the prima facie showing is to
eliminate the common reasons for denial of employment: the
employer never had a position available, no longer needs a position
filled, or the applicant was not qualified. The burden then shifts to the
employer to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the
employment action."' Finally, after a reason is articulated, the burden
shifts back to the employee to show that the employer's reason was
pretextual.62
The Court created this framework with the general goals of Title
VII in mind. 3 The Court wrote in dicta that
[t]he language of Title VIL makes plain the purpose of Congress to
assure equality of employment opportunities and to eliminate those
discriminatory practices and devices which have fostered racially
stratified job environments to the disadvantage of minority
citizens ...."Congress did not intend by Title VII, however, to
guarantee a job to every person regardless of qualifications. ' 4

(7th Cir. 1999) (citing Weigel v. Target Stores, 122 F.3d 461, 464 (7th Cir. 1997)).
"Disparate treatment claims are analyzed somewhat differently than failure to
accommodate claims. In disparate treatment claims, the McDonnell Douglas burdenshifting framework commonly employed in Title VII and ADEA actions is generally
appropriate ....whereas in failure to accommodate claims the McDonnell Douglas
framework is 'unnecessary and inappropriate."' Weigel, 122 F.3d at 464 (citations
omitted).
59. McDonnell Douglas, 41 t U.S. at 802.
60. Gold, supra note 3, at 11.
61. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. See Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255-56 (1981) (explaining that the burden of persuasion does
not shift to the employer, but the employer merely has an evidentiary burden of
production to articulate a legitimate reason for the employment action).
62. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05.
63. This framework applies both at the summary judgment stage and if the case
were to survive summary judgment and proceed to trial. See, e.g., Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Prod., 530 U.S. 133,140 (2000) (utilizing the McDonnell Douglas
framework in a case which went to the jury); Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799,
804 (6th Cir. 1998) (utilizing the McDonnell Douglas framework in a case which was
disposed of on summary judgment). This framework is helpful at the summary
judgment stage to determine if the respective burdens are met.
64. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 800 (citations omitted).
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Thus, the discrimination laws do not grant affirmative rights, but
merely protect one from invidious discrimination.
Almost a decade after articulating the framework in McDonnell
Douglas, the Court reconsidered the proper burdens. In Texas
Departmentof Community Affairs v. Burdine,66 the Court specifically
granted certiorari to determine whether a defendant's burden during
the second prong of the McDonnell Douglas test was a burden of
production or a burden of persuasion.67 The Court determined it was
In this case, a female
more akin to a burden of production. 8
accounting clerk was not promoted and was subsequently fired.69 She
sued under Title VII for gender discrimination.7 " The district court
held that there was no evidence of gender discrimination, and the
Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the defendant did not sufficiently
rebut the prima facie case with its nondiscriminatory reason.7 1 The
Fifth Circuit reaffirmed its view that the defendant must prove its
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason by a preponderance of the
evidence, but this was incorrect according to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court vacated and announced the appropriate
standard.73 The Court held that the ultimate burden of proving
discrimination remains at all times with the plaintiff.7" The plaintiff
The
must satisfy the initial prima facie showing of discrimination.
legitimate
to
show
a
defendant
to
the
burden then shifts
nondiscriminatory reason.76 The Court described this burden as a
burden of production which the defendant can meet with admissible
evidence.77 The Court further described defendants as bearing only
the burden of explaining clearly the reasons for its employment
The defendant need not prove that it was actually
decision."
motivated by its proffered reasons." The Courit additionally noted
that Title VII was enacted to prohibit discrimination and not to give
Indeed, the
preferential treatment to women or minorities."'

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

See supra note 11.
450 U.S. 248.
Id. at 250.
Id. at 259-60.
Id. at 250-51.
Id. at 250-51.
Id. at 251-52.
Id. at 252.
Id.
Id. at 253.
Id. at 254.
Id.
Id. at 255.
Id. at 260.
Id. at 254.
Id. at 259.
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employer retains discretion to choose between two "equally qualified
candidates.""1
2. The Importance of the Pretext Step
Many McDonnell Douglas discrimination cases turn on whether an
employer's legitimate nondiscriminatory reason is pretext for
discrimination. Pretext is defined as "something that is put forward to
conceal a true purpose or object; an ...excuse.
To make a
successful claim of discrimination, the employee must offer evidence
to show that the employer's legitimate reason for the personnel action
is in fact a pretext for discrimination. 3 The pretext step provides the
employee the chance to show that the employer's legitimate reason
was not the real reason for the employment action. 4 On the one
hand, pretext has been held to be more than a mistake by an
employer. 5 Specifically, it has been held to mean a "phony" reason."
The reason for this explanation is that if pretext were merely a
mistake, plaintiff's testimony of such a mistake would often create
genuine factual issues in discrimination casesY However, others view
81. Id.
82. Random House, Webster's Unabridged Dictionary 1534 (1997). There is a
debate within the courts as to exactly what type of pretext would suffice for a plaintiff
to survive summary judgment. In St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 534
(1993), the Court indicated that perhaps more than a showing of pretext was
necessary to prove intentional discrimination. After Hicks, the pretext-only and
pretext-plus circuit split arose.
Courts adhering to the "pretext-plus" school believed that an employee
needed to prove the employer's proffered reasons false and that additional
evidence of intentional discrimination existed in order to support an
inference of discrimination through the indirect method of proof. Judgment
in favor of an employer was proper if an employee failed to present
"pretext-plus" evidence. Conversely, courts adhering to the "pretext-only"
school believed that evidence of falsity was sufficient to support the
inference of discrimination; proof of falsity alone yielded a verdict for an
employee.
Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Getting It Right: Uncertainty and Error in the New Disparate
Treatment Paradigm, 60 AIb. L. Rev. 1, 32 (1996). The Court in Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 149-54 (2000), clarified the confusion that resulted
from its opinion in Hicks, essentially holding that in most cases pretext-only is
sufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment. Although this issue is beyond
the scope of this Note, the split is nonetheless important. See Ryan Vantrease, Note,
The Aftermath of St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks and Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Products, Inc.: A Callfor Clarification, 39 Brandeis L.J. 747 (2001); Kevin
W. Williams, Note, The Reasonable Accommodation Difference: The Effect of
Applying the Burden Shifting Frameworks Developed under Title VII in Disparate
Treatment Cases to Claims Brought under Title I of the Americans With Disabilities
Act, 18 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 98 (1997).
83. See infra Part 1.B.1.
84. Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981).
85. Tincher v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 118 F.3d 1125, 1129 (7th Cir. 1997).
86. Id.
87. Green v. Nat'l Steel Corp., 197 F.3d 894, 899 (7th Cir. 1999).
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a claim of pretext as where an employee can offer evidence "that the
[defendant's] proffered reason had no basis in fact,"88 for example,
"that the employer mistakenly believed that the employee lied to
receive disability benefits."8 9
In McDonnell Douglas, the Court held that Green could have
shown pretext by showing evidence that white employees -who were
involved in the stall-in were rehired." Green could have also used
evidence such as his managers' treatment of him 'during his
employment, their reaction to Green's "legitimate civil rights
activities," and their policies with respect to minority employment."
Some circuits have developed an honest belief rule which shields an
employer from pretext-based liability when the employer's legitimate
reason is honestly held, but perhaps without basis in fact. The circuits
disagree, however, over what constitutes an honest belief.92 The
precise origin of the honest belief rule is not clear. The rule has
developed from judicial decisions concerning the second and third
legitimate
of the
McDonnell Douglas framework:
steps
nondiscriminatory reasons and pretext, respectively.9 3 The rule has
become known as the honest belief rule because the rule is based on
honesty of an employer's belief in its legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason. 4 Essentially, one could argue the split concerns the subjective
"pure" honest view versus the objective honest plus reasonableness
view. This Note addresses this split.

II. THE SPLIT
This Note attempts to resolve the split over what exactly constitutes
an honest belief. An honest belief essentially requires an employer's
belief in its legitimate reason for taking personnel action against an
employee to be honestly held. Thus, the legitimate reason does not
have to be correct. For example, if an employer's legitimate reason
88. Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799, 805 (6th Cir. 1998); see also Kralman v.
Illinois Dep't of Veterans' Affairs, 23 F.3d 150, 156 (7th Cir. 1994) (explaining that
there is a "fine line" between evidence that shows an employer's reason was unworthy
of belief and evidence that shows the employer had poor business judgment).
89. Dana W. Atchley, Note, Legislative Reform: The Americans with Disabilities
Act: You Can't Honestly Believe That!, 25 J. Legis. 229, 231 (1999). But see New York
Empl. L.-Prac., Oct. 2002, vol. 4, No. I at 9 ("Proof that one of an employer's stated
reasons for terminating an employee is false does not defeat a motion for summary
judgment absent evidence that the false reason was a pretext for discrimination."
(citing Augustus v. MSG Metro Channel, 2002 WL 1977732 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27,
2002))). Note that even if a mistake did constitute pretext, in jurisdictions that
subscribe to some version of the honest belief rule an employer will still be protected
by the rule. See infra Part II.
90. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973).
91. Id. at 804-05.
92. See infra Part II.
93. See infra Part II.
94. See infra Part I.
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for firing an employee was because that employee stole property from
the employer, this reason need not be true. An employer must only
honestly believe that the employee stole property. The jurisdictions
95
differ, however, over what exactly constitutes an honest belief.
Some jurisdictions simply require that an employer's belief in their
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason be honestly held,96 while other
jurisdictions require the belief to be both honest and reasonable.97 In
essence, the split concerns the evidence the employee and employer
must offer at the summary judgment stage." The reason the split is at
issue during the summary judgment stage is because if plaintiff is not
able to show some evidence of pretext to rebut defendant's legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason and create a genuine issue of material fact,
the case will be dismissed.99
A. The "Pure" Honest Belief Regime
Employees in a "pure" honest belief regime may not attack the
reasonableness of an employer's belief in its legitimate reason for
personnel action. They must focus their discrimination suit on
evidence that points to discriminatory motive, or evidence that
indicates their employer's belief in its legitimate reason for taking
action was not honest.
This view has its greatest support from the Seventh Circuit," 1 but
has been followed by other circuits."1" The rule in the Seventh Circuit
95. See infra Part II.A, B.
96. See infra Part II.A.
97. See infra Part II.B.
98. Fed R. Civ. P. 56(c). Summary judgment is only appropriate if "there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact." Id.
99. See Benjamin D. McAninch, Comment, Removing the Thumb from the Scale:
The Eleventh Circuit Summary Judgment Standard for Disparate Treatment Cases in
the Wake of Chapman v. AI Transport., 53 Ala. L. Rev. 949 (2002), for a discussion of
summary judgment in disparate treatment cases. Essentially, the courts employ the
McDonnell Douglas framework and its burdens to determine a motion for summary
judgment.
100. See, e.g., Crim v. Board of Educ. of Cairo Sch. Dist. No. 1, 147 F.3d 535, 541
(7th Cir. 1998) ('"Because a Title VII claim requires intentional discrimination, the
pretext inquiry focuses on whether the employer's stated reason was honest, not
whether it was accurate."'); Tincher v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 118 F.3d 1125, 1130 (7th
Cir. 1997) ("The pretext inquiry focuses on the honesty-not the accuracy-of the
employer's stated reason for the termination."); Pollard v. Rea Magnet Wire Co., 824
F.2d 557, 559 (7th Cir. 1987) ("A reason honestly described but poorly founded is not
a pretext.").
101. See, e.g., Twilley v. Integris Baptist Medical Center, Inc., No. 00-6091, 2001
U.S. App. LEXIS 18173, at *4-5 (10th Cir. Aug. 10, 2001) (holding that plaintiff
cannot survive summary judgment if he alleges no facts which show that the
employer's belief was not honest); Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc., 186 F.3d 1301,
1318 (10th Cir. 1999) ("The relevant inquiry is not whether [the employer's] proffered
reasons were wise, fair or correct, but whether [the employer] honestly believed those
reasons .. ");Fischbach v. District of Columbia Dep't of Corr., 86 F.3d 1180, 1183
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (explaining in a Title VII suit that "[o]nce the employer has
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originated from decisions explaining that during the pretext stage, the
court will not inquire into business processes."12 From there, the
Court held that if an employer honestly explained the reasons for a
decision, there was no pretext for discrimination." 3 This formulation
in essence became the honest belief rule.
The Seventh Circuit articulated its honest belief rule in McCoy v.
WGN Continental Broadcasting Co."'4 Ron McCoy, a forty-six-yearold male, was terminated from his position at a television station and
sued for age discrimination."" He was essentially asking the court to
hold that WGN's promotion and demotion processes were not
sound." 6 The court determined that this was something the judiciary
should not be charged with."" McCoy was not approaching his
burden correctly. To survive summary judgment, the court held,
McCoy had to create some factual issue about whether the station's
beliefs in its legitimate reason for firing were honestly held." 8 McCoy,
however, offered evidence that WGN's decision was not financially
beneficial to the company and that the company should not have
demoted him so quickly." 9
His evidence at the pretext stage
incorrectly targeted the station's business judgment. I"
The court noted the importance of an employer's independent
business judgment and articulated an understanding of the pretext
stage of the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine framework. The court
firmly announced that it did not "sit as a super-personnel department"
reviewing business decisions."'
Pretext, according to the McCoy
court, should turn not on whether the employer's leason for the
termination is correct or desirable, but rather on whether the
articulated a non-discriminatory explanation for its action, as did the District here, the
issue is not 'the correctness or desirability of [the] reasons offered ...[but] whether
the employer honestly believes in the reasons it offers."' (citations omitted)); Dister v.
Continental Group, Inc., 859 F.2d 1108, 1113 (2d Cir. 1988) ("merely raising a genuine
issue of fact as to the credence of [the employer's] asserted reason is an insufficient
basis to refuse the grant of summary judgment").
102. See Dorsch v. L.B. Foster Co., 782 F.2d 1421,1426 (7th Cir. 1986) (as long as a
business decision was genuinely and honestly made, the court will not inquire into the
decision); Pollard, 824 F.2d at 559 (noting that the court does not review business
decisions regardless of how mistaken they were).
103. Additionally, in Pollard, the court discussed pretext and held that if you
honestly explain the reasons behind your decision, this is not a pretext. Id. at 559. In
later decisions the court continued to focus on the honesty of an employer's asserted
reasons. See, e.g., Fairchild v. Forma Scientific, Inc., 147 F.3d 567, 573 (7th Cir. 1998);
Nabat v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., No. 93-3757, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 376, at *17-18
(7th Cir. Jan. 9, 1995).
104. 957 F.2d 368 (7th Cir. 1992).
105. Id. at 370.
106. Id. at 373.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 374.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 373-74.
111. Id. at 373.
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employer honestly believed in the reason it offered." 2 The court
concluded that McCoy's efforts to "ward off summary judgment by
showing pretext bear more on the issue of mistake on [the station's]
part than on the issue of whether [the station]
honestly believed in the
3
reasons it has offered for its actions."''1
While the McCoy rule was unambiguous, the court in Gustovich v.
AT&T Communications, Inc., offered clarifying examples of how an
employee can attack the honesty of the belief."' In Gustovich, six
supervisors over the age of forty were terminated and filed suit under
the ADEA and the employer was granted summary judgment." 5 The
supervisors tried to survive summary judgment by offering evidence
that they were incorrectly rated and had they been properly rated,
they would not have been fired.'" The court held that the supervisors
could not rebut an employer's legitimate reason by showing that they
were adequate employees and their employer ratings were
incorrect." 7 They were required to show that the employer's reasons
were pretext for a discriminatory purpose."' The court held that
statements about the accuracy of the ratings "may create a material
dispute about the employee's ability but do nothing to create a dispute
about the employer's honesty-do nothing, in other words, to
establish that the proffered reason is a pretext for discrimination." ' 9
The court then offered ways in which the employee could have
attacked the honesty to succeed at the pretext stage: they could have
(1) come up with evidence to show that the evaluations had been
"cooked" by showing, for example, discriminatory attitudes, or (2)
compared the firm's treatment of similarly situated people of different
ages."" Despite their attempts, the employees failed to meet these
standards because they compared general comments from different
managers' reviews of other employees to their own reviews. 2 ' The
court said that this comparison was too general for the sake of

accuracy.122
The court in Gustovich reiterated the sentiment of McCoy,
proclaiming that "a district court hearing a case under the ADEA
should not be mistaken for a labor arbitrator."'' 23 The Seventh Circuit

112.
113.
114.
1992).
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
Id.
Gustovich v. AT&T Communications, Inc., 972 F.2d 845, 848-49 (7th Cir.
Id. at 847.
Id. at 848,
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 848-49.
Id. at 849.
Id.
Id. at 848.
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would not concern itself with the accuracy of the rating system, a
concern the court willingly left to the business.124
The Seventh Circuit's rule was firmly established when it decided
Kariotis v. Navistar International Transportation Corp.125 This case
tested the limits of the "pure" honest belief rule because the
company's actions were arguably more irrational than in McCoy and
Gustovich. The court, however, once again shielded an employer with
the honest belief rule, reasoning that the discrimination laws do not
1 26
allow interference with management's decision making process.
The court stressed that it was not a court of industrial relations and as
such must observe its limitations.127 The court articulated the honest
belief rule-according to the facts of this case-to "mean[] that while
the company may have been mistaken in concluding Kariotis actually
had committed fraud, at the very least it had an honest belief that she
had done so." ' 128 In this case, a fifty-seven-year-old, female, disabled
employee was defeated on summary judgment in her suit against
Navistar after she was fired for fraudulently accepting disability
benefits. 29
Kathleen Kariotis took leave from work after knee replacement
surgery and had to extend the leave beyond the length of time
originally anticipated. 3 " In accordance with company policy, she
received sixty percent of her salary during this extended leave. 1 '
Management became suspicious that extended leave was not
warranted. 3 2 The company videotaped her on separate occasions and
witnessed her walking, driving, and bending before her second knee
surgery. 33 The company never spoke with her physicians or asked her
to be examined by one of their own physicians.'34 One of the
managers spoke with Kariotis, and she claimed that after her second
knee surgery she was able to do much more than before.'35 However,
management disbelieved this statement in light of Kariotis's activities
on the videotape before her second knee surgery. 36 She was then
terminated and replaced by a thirty-two-year-old woman.137

124. Id.
125. 131 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 1997). But see supra Part 1I.B for a discussion of the
Sixth Circuit's view which differs from the Seventh Circuit's view.
126. Kariotis, 131 F.3d at 678.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 674.
129. Id. at 675.
130. Id. at 674.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 675.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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The plaintiff indisputably made out a prima facie case in accordance
with the McDonnell Douglas framework. 3 ' Navistar had set forth its
honest reasons for their employment decision: the evidence from the
videotape and the lie she told about her abilities before the second
knee surgery. 3 Then, Kariotis had a chance to rebut the employer's
offered reasons. 4 " The Seventh Circuit reemphasized its honest belief
rule:
[A]n opportunity for rebuttal is not an invitation to criticize the
employer's evaluation process or simply to question its conclusion
about the quality of an employee's performance .... [B]ecause the
question is not whether the employer's reasons for a decision are
''right but whether the employer's description of its reasons is
honest."''
Kariotis alleged that the investigation was "imprudent, ill-informed
and inaccurate."' 42 The court held that the investigation was the
reason given for the discharge, and "a reason honestly described but
poorly founded is not a pretext as that term is used in the law of
discrimination."14' 3 The court opined that perhaps she needed to show
evidence that she was investigated differently from other employees
because of age or disability before she would have been able to show
pretext."'
The Seventh Circuit consistently focuses on the honesty of the
employer's belief in its legitimate nondiscriminatory reason. At the
pretext stage of the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine framework, an
employee will not survive summary judgment if he attempts to have
his employer's business decisions or judgment reviewed for
reasonableness. The employee, to be successful, must rebut the
honesty of the employer's reason or point to evidence indicating
discrimination. For example, the employee can try to show evidence
of discriminatory attitudes, or differences in treatment between
protected and non-protected individuals. The employee will not be
successful by showing evidence that an employer made a mistake,
unless this can prove that the employer's belief was dishonest.
B. The Honest Belief Plus Reasonableness Regime
Employees in an honest belief regime may attack the
reasonableness of an employer's belief in its legitimate reason for
personnel action. They can put forth evidence showing an employer

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 676.
Id. at 676-77.
Id. at 677.
Id. at 677 (citations and emphasis omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 678.
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was unreasonable in its belief in addition to offering evidence
indicating a discriminatory animus or lack of honesty.
The Sixth Circuit has held that an employee can rebut an
employer's legitimate nondiscriminatory reason by attacking not only
its honesty, but also the reasonableness of its belief. As the court
noted in Smith v. Chrysler,145 an employer has an honest belief in its
reason for discharging an employee when the employer reasonably
relied "on the particularized facts that were before it at the time the
decision was made.' 46 In a reasonableness regime, the employer will
be more subject to judicial scrutiny in its selection, firing, and
promotion processes than in the "pure" honest belief regime. 147 In a
reasonableness regime, employers concerned about discrimination
charges must document their processes adequately in an effort to
establish the reasonableness of their belief. 4
The Sixth Circuit's version of the honest belief rule-similar to the
Seventh Circuit's-emerged from a discussion of pretext. The Sixth
Circuit's version of pretext differed from the Seventh Circuit's in that
it required reasonableness. 49 The court expressly rejected the "pure"
honest belief rule and announced the honest belief plus
reasonableness rule in Smith v. Chrysler.5
In this case, James Smith brought suit under the ADA against
Chrysler alleging that he was terminated as a result of unlawful
discrimination. 5 ' Smith was diagnosed a narcoleptic, but failed to
disclose this condition on his employment form or on a driver's license
application which permitted him to operate heavy machinery.'5 2
Smith's physician had written a letter requesting that he be switched
to the day shift from the night shift because day employment would
help normalize his sleep schedule.'5 3 Smith, however, contended that
his record showed that he had a disorder related to narcolepsy, but it
145. Smith v. Chrysler, 155 F.3d 799 (6th Cir. 1998).
146. Id. at 807; see also Kurincic v. Stein, Inc., No. 00-3747, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS
2582, at *9-10 (6th Cir. Feb. 14, 2002) (holding that an employer has an honest belief
when its belief is reasonable); Pesterfield v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 941 F.2d 437, 443 (6th
Cir. 1991) (holding that the employer must reasonably rely on the facts).
147. See infra Part ll.B.2.
148. The reasonableness view does not necessarily require the employer's decision
to be reasonable, but requires the employer's belief in its decision to be reasonable.
Thus, if an employer has a belief that an employee stole property from the employer,
but has no evidence and made no investigation, its belief might not be considered
honest under a reasonableness regime, even though firing someone for stealing is
reasonable. The distinction is sometimes difficult to make because, in essence, this is
imposing somewhat of a reasonableness requirement on employers' decisions.
149. The court noted in Smith, 155 F.3d at 806-07, that it was the first time it had
discussed the honest belief rule in the ADA context, but it had discussed the rule in
the Rehabilitation Act context in Pesterfield, 941 F. 2d at 443.
150. Smith v. Chrysler, 155 F.3d at 806.
151. Id. at 801.
152. Id. at 802.
153. Id. at 803.
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was not considered actual narcolepsy.1 14 He was subsequently fired
for lying on his employment form and driver's license application. 5 '
Management based this decision on letters from physicians,
conversations with those physicians, and a belief that Smith could
suddenly fall asleep on the job."' The district court held that Smith
was unable to demonstrate that management's reasons were
pretextual' 57 Smith did not dispute that Chrysler offered a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for his firing: he had lied on medical forms
and on his driver's license application.'
Smith contended, however,
that Chrysler's59 reasons for the firing were a pretext for
discrimination.
The Smith court discussed the Seventh Circuit's "pure" honest
belief rule and rejected the rule inasmuch as the rule did not require
an employer "to demonstrate that its belief was reasonably grounded
on particularized facts that were before it at the time of the
employment action."'' " The court found this abstract rule at odds
with the purpose of anti-discriminatory statutes, which were
implemented to prevent discriminatory employment actions based on
"unfounded fear."' Thus, the court held that in deciding whether the
employment decision was made in good faith, the employer must have
had "a reasonable basis for reaching its conclusion."' ' The court said:
[W]hen the employee is able to produce sufficient evidence to
establish that the employer failed to make a reasonably informed
and considered decision before taking its adverse employment
action, thereby making its decisional process "unworthy of
credence," then any reliance placed by the
employer in such a
3
process cannot be said to be honestly held.16
The court, however, noted that it would not require the employer to
leave "no stone unturned," but would require merely that the
employer make an informed decision." 4
Despite this heightened burden, the court affirmed summary
judgment for Chrysler based on Chrysler's legitimate good faith belief
that Smith had lied on medical forms.' 5 Chrysler established
reasonable reliance based on the false documentation, and its reliance

154. Id. at 805.
155. Id. at 804.
156. Id.

157. Id. at 808.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

1d. at 805.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 805.
Id. at 807.
Id. at 807-08.
Id. at 807.
Id. at 801.

2003]

LEGITIMATE REASONS FOR FIRING

2665

on the letters and discussions with doctors.166 The burden then shifted
to Smith to show that Chrysler's reliance on those
factors was
67
unreasonable. Smith was unable to meet this burden.
The court held that Chrysler was reasonable in relying on the
evidence from the doctors that Smith suffered from narcolepsy, and
the evidence that he lied on his driver's license application. 16
However, Chrysler was not reasonable in relying on the alleged lie in
the medical form. 6 9 The question on the form concerned whether
Smith suffered from tiredness or fatigue to which he answered no.
However, "[t]iredness and fatigue ...do not even remotely cover the
situation experienced by narcoleptics."' 17 Thus, it was not reasonable
for Chrysler to rely on this stereotype that narcoleptics suffer from
these symptoms because it was not accurate. 7 ' However, this was not
harmful to Chrysler because their other reasons for the termination
were satisfactory and this alone 1did
not rise to an inference that the
72
real reasons were discriminatory.
The court reiterated its position in Snowden v. Procter & Gamble
and indicated reasonable employer responses. 73 In this case, Larry
Snowden was fired after ten years of service to Procter and Gamble
("P&G") and sued for violation of the ADA. 174 The court held that
Snowden failed to establish pretext.'75 Snowden repeatedly received
accommodation from P&G until there was a change in his work team.
Management notified him that his unpredictable requests for
accommodation caused hardship on his entire group.'76 He was also
notified that a fellow employee claimed to have seen him at Wal-Mart
during his shift.'77 P&G investigated this claim by asking other
employees whether they had seen Snowden at work on that
occasion. 71 Snowden was fired79 after the notes of the investigation
were reviewed by management.
P&G's explanation for Snowden's termination was that Snowden
had left the plant during working hours and Snowden, while denying
he left the plant, did not try to argue that this explanation had no basis

166. Id. at 808.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 808-09.
172. Id. at 809.
173. Snowden v. Procter & Gamble, No. 00-5268, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 16132
(6th Cir. July 17, 2001).
174. Id. at *1
175. Id.
176. Id. at *2.
177. Id. at *3.
178. Id. at *4.
179. Id. at *5.
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in fact.' .. Instead, Snowden argued that "P&G failed to make a
reasonable and informed decision to terminate him."'" The court
held that P&G met their burden of showing "particularized facts
8 2
underlying its decision" through a reasonable investigation.
Snowden tried to offer evidence showing that P&G failed to make a
reasonable decision because the employer could have asked security
guards whether they remembered Snowden's car being in the lot and
they could have reviewed Wal-Mart security cameras." 3 The court
held that these suggestions did not show that the investigation
conducted by P&G was unreasonable. They were simply other
avenues that P&G could have pursued. 4
After an initial reading of Smith and Snowden, one might
understand the technical difference between the Sixth and Seventh
Circuit rules, but one might not realize the practical difference
because the court, in both cases, ruled in favor of the employer
despite a reasonableness requirement. The requirement, however,
does have teeth. Indeed, the Sixth Circuit has ruled in favor of the
employee based on an employer's unreasonable belief.
In Archer v. Mesaba Aviation, Inc., the court refused to uphold the
reasonableness of the employer's belief and found its legitimate
reason to be pretextual 8 5 The court, nonetheless, reiterated that in
order for Mesaba to be protected by the honest belief rule, the
company had to establish their "reasonable reliance on the
particularized facts that were before it at the time the decision was
made."' 6
Paul Archer, an HIV-positive employee, sued Mesaba, a small
regional airline, under the ADA. He alleged that he was fired from
his sales position because of his disability.8 7 Mesaba tried to establish
the reasonableness of its legitimate reason by asserting that employees
complained about Archer leaving work early, that Archer harassed a
flight attendant while traveling on one of Mesaba's planes, and that he
Mesaba
engaged in sexual activity while aboard a Mesaba aircraft.'
conducted an investigation, but received conflicting reports about the
Archer was never
validity of the alleged sexual encounter.'8"
he
informed of the
was
nor
the
action
to
permitted to respond

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
*2 (6th
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id. at *9-10.
Id. at *14.
Id. at *11.
Id. at *13-14.
Id. at *14.
Archer v. Mesaba Aviation, Inc., No. 98-2434, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 6420, at
Cir. Apr. 3, 2000).
Id. at *17 (citations omitted).
Id. at *2.
Id. at *3-11.
Id. at *9.
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allegations. 9" Mesaba claimed that even if the events were not true,
they had an honest belief that they occurred. 9 The Sixth Circuit held
that Archer had established pretext. 9 2 The court held that Mesaba
did not reasonably rely on particularized facts and could not be
protected by the honest belief rule. 93 The court based its decision on
conflicting information from the flight attendant.1 94 Furthermore, the
pilot indicated he failed to see anything during the flight (though the
flight attendant told him what was allegedly occurring), while the
employer failed to review information and did not inform Archer of
the allegations or give him an opportunity to respond. 195 Thus, the
determination of this case turned on reasonableness.
If the Archer case was filed in a "pure" honest belief regime, the
outcome probably would have been different. Mesaba would be
protected by its honest belief in its legitimate reason. The court would
not inquire into the reasonableness of the company's belief or its
investigative technique as did the Sixth Circuit.
The reasonableness position allows an employee the opportunity to
rebut a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, in an attempt to show
pretext, with facts indicating the employer's belief in its employment
decision was not reasonable. Thus, in the Sixth Circuit, it is not
enough for an employer's belief to be honest if it is unreasonable.
Practically, an employer must ensure that proper steps or procedures
were followed before employment action is taken. If employers do
not take these steps, they risk a court deciding that their procedures
were not reasonable.
III.

RESOLUTION OF THE SPLIT

Adoption of the "pure" honest belief rule makes sense in light of
the burdens set forth in McDonnell Douglas,96

the autonomy

necessary for a business to function, and general judicial policy. There
can be no intent to discriminate if an employer has an honest and
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the action. The Seventh
Circuit and the other jurisdictions that have adopted the "pure"
honest belief view are not advocating that the employee show direct
evidence'97 of discrimination to survive summary judgment, nor are
they claiming that any reason that appears to be honestly held by the
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

*19.
*17.
*18.
*17-18.

194. Id. at *19.

195. Id.
196. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). This case is a Title VII case. See supra note 97 for an
example in which the honest belief split occurred in a Title VII suit. See also supra
note 58 for cases showing that the McDonnell Douglas test applies under the ADA
and ADEA.
197. See supra note 42 for a discussion of direct and circumstantial evidence.
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employer will be blindly accepted. The courts allow for the employee
to rebut the honesty of the belief itself. This approach adequately
reveals intent to discriminate and whether real reasons are being
covered up."51 Examining the reasonableness of an employer's
decision relates not to intent, but to business rules and operations, an
area in which the court should not be involved." 99 Thus, this Note
does not advocate that employee's rights be diminished in any way,
but advocates a fair playing field for both the employer and employee.
A. The Proper Burden for the Employer and Employee
The burden in a McDonnell Douglas discrimination case remains
with the employee throughout the discrimination suit. Once the
employee has successfully made out a prima facie case of
discrimination the employer then must articulate a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for the firing. However, the burden never
fully shifts to the employer. The Court in Burdine said: "The nature
of the burden that shifts to the defendant should be understood in
light of the plaintiff's ultimate and intermediate burdens. The
ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant
intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times
with the plaintiff."'2 .. Therefore, requiring the employer to do more
than articulate a reason is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's
decision in McDonnell Douglas.
The Supreme Court, in reference to the employer's burden, has
stated that the "employer's burden is satisfied if he simply 'explains
what he has done' or 'produc[es] evidence of legitimate
nondiscriminatory reasons."''
For example, in Gustovich v. AT&T
Communications, Inc., 2 the employer simply had to articulate that
the employees were fired because they were the weakest employees
and presumably show the tests they used. Had the employer in
Gustovich been subject to the reasonableness version of the honest
belief rule, the employer would have had to establish the steps they
went through to determine that these employees were the weakest.
198. See infra Part IiI.B for a discussion of the importance of accuracy of the
reason in the just cause regime.
199. While disparate impact theory concerns itself with the rules and operations of
a business, disparate treatment is based on intent to discriminate and analysis into the

rules and operations is not necessary. Analysis of' the rules and operations of a
business in certain aspects is essential to a disparate impact claim which is based on a
practice or policy which adversely affects a protected group. However, even in a

disparate impact claim the court must observe proper limits in second-guessing
business decisions. See supra notes 22-23, 43.

200. Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 45t U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
201. Bd. of Tr. v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 25 (1978) (finding that the court of appeals

had placed too heavy of a burden on the employer and reiterated that the employer

only need articulate a legitimate reason).
202. Gustovich v. AT&T Communications, Inc., 972 F.2d 845 (7th Cir. 1992); see
also supra Part If.A.
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Their business rules, specifically the method for determining the
weakest, would have been subject to analysis by the court.
Determination of who is the weakest employee will differ from
company to company and thus requires different tests because each
company is looking for different strengths in employees. Thus,
utilizing the reasonableness test in addition to the "pure" honest
belief of the employer demands too much of the employer. While one
might argue that the terms "legitimate" and "nondiscriminatory" can
be equated with reasonableness, this is not necessarily the case. A
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason is simply one that does not utilize
an individual's membership in a protected class. Itcan be completely
unreasonable such as a belief that the employee stole company
property. Such an honest belief, whether correct or not, is not based
on membership in a protected group.
The honest belief rule requires employees to meet their burden of
persuasion that must be maintained throughout their discrimination
case.23 Allowing a claim to survive summary judgment just because
the employer's reason might not have been reasonable in the eyes of
the court does not hold an employee to the burden of persuasion. An
employee should be required to rebut the articulation of the
legitimate reason with something that
elicits evidence of a
2 4
discriminatory motive or lack of honesty. 0
The Supreme Court's jurisprudence in the area of First Amendment
law can provide an appropriate comparison. There is a similar
honesty versus reasonableness split in the area of public speech by
government employers .2
This area is relevant to the employment
discrimination laws because the First Amendment's Freedom of
Speech Clause 206 protects public employees in employment as do
discrimination laws." 7 To summarize, when an employee publicly
speaks, information that is a matter of public concern is protected
speech under the First Amendment. 201 When speech is protected, an

203. See supra Part i.B.1 for a discussion of the burdens set forth by the court in
McDonnell Douglas and Burdine.

204. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
205. See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 (1994).
206. U.S. Const. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom
of speech ...").
207. The protection afforded by the First Amendment's Free Speech clause can be
considered an express exception to at will employment for public employees. See
supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
208. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983); see also Churchill, 511 U.S. at 668.
To be protected, the speech must be on a matter of public concern, and the
employee's interest in expressing herself on this matter must not be
outweighed by any injury the speech could cause to "the interest of the
State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it
performs through its employees.
Churchill, 511 U.S. at 668 (citations omitted).
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employee cannot suffer personal action as a result of the speech.2 9
The split in this area arises when it is unclear if the speech is protected
or unclear exactly what the speech was. 2' In this instance, there are
different views on what constitutes a legitimate reason for the firing:
(1) the employer's belief that the speech was not protected must be in
good faith and must be reasonable; or (2) the employer's belief that
the speech was not protected must be honest.2 1'
In Waters v. Churchill, a plurality of the Supreme Court decided to
adopt the reasonableness test and thus determined that an employer
must make a reasonable investigation to determine whether the
speech was protected before taking action.212 Three Justices, while
concurring in the judgment, advocated upholding the simple honesty
rule. 2 3 They believed that a rule of reasonableness would give the
employees new First Amendment rights to an investigation and would
stand in opposition to the Court's jurisprudence: 214 Justice Scalia said,
"[T]he genuineness of a public employer's asserted permissible
'2
justification for an employment decision ... is all that is necessary. 11
The plurality noted that they were advocating this "reasonableness"
approach because "the possibility of inadvertently punishing someone
for exercising her First Amendment rights makes such care
necessary. ' ' 2 16
Thus, the exact approach in this area remains
uncertain.21 7
209. Churchill, 511 U.S. at 695 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that government
personnel action based on protected speech may in some instances violate the First
Amendment).
210. Id. at 668.
211. Justice O'Connor, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Souter and Ginsburg
advocated the reasonable test. Id. at 664, 677. Justice Souter additionally advocated
going one step further by adopting the reasonableness test with a requirement that
the employer actually believe the results of the investigation. Id. at 682-83 (Souter, J.,
concurring). Justices Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas advocated the honest test. Id. at
686 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justices Stevens and Blackmun dissented advocating
complete protection of the employee when First Amendment rights are at issue, thus
advocating complete accuracy. Id. at 699 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
212. Id. at 678. in this case, a nurse was overheard complaining about her
department and supervisor and was fired without even being asked her side of the
story. She alleged that her termination was a result of her speech and prior
complaints she had made. She brought an action alleging that her First Amendment
right to free speech was violated and the district court granted summary judgment to
the employer. The Seventh Circuit reversed concluding that the nurse's speech was a
matter of public concern and thus protected. The Supreme Court held that summary
judgment was not warranted because there was an issue of fact about what actually
motivated the employer. Id. at 681.
213. Id. at 686 (Scalia, J. concurring).
214. Id. (Scalia, J. concurring).
215. Id. at 690 (Scalia, J. concurring).
216. Id. at 678.
217. See D. Keith Fortner, Note, Constitutional Law-First Amendment and
Freedom of Speech-Public Employers Must Conduct a Reasonable Investigation To
Determine if an Employee's Speech Is Protected Before Discharging the Employee
Based upon the Speech, 18 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 463, 488 (1996) (discussing the
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The government employer must make a legal determination when it
decides whether an employee's speech is protected or not. On the
other hand, a non-governmental employer deciding whether to fire an
individual is not making a legal determination, but rather a factual
determination. The employer is deciding that an employee is not
satisfying his criteria for employment.
Employers usually lack
expertise in making legal determinations, therefore, perhaps a
government employer should be held to a higher standard when
making a legal determination as opposed to a factual determination.
In light of the fact that the Supreme Court itself is divided in the
First Amendment area about whether to require reasonableness on
the part of the government employer,2" it is legitimate to believe that
in the area of discrimination laws the Court would not hold an
employer to such a high bar. 19
First Amendment rights are
fundamental rights which the government must protect.22
While
discrimination laws are important to a civilized society, they do not
create fundamental rights nor do they even create affirmative rights.22
They simply allow people the protection of not being discriminated
222
against in employment.
While it can be argued that such protection does exist in other areas
of the law which do not involve fundamental rights, mainly just cause
termination cases, those circumstances are entirely different than a
firing at will. Generally, employment is at will and thus an employer
and employee can terminate the employment relationship for any
Churchillcase).
218. Note that this split only occurs in the government employer context and a
private employer is permitted to fire for speech. See David C. Yamada, Voices From
the Cubicle: Protecting and Encouraging Private Employee Speech in the PostIndustrial Workplace, 19 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 1, 22-25 (1998) (noting that the
state action doctrine prevents the First Amendment from applying to private sector
employees and employers).
219. The Supreme Court has shown deference to business decisions. See Kamen v.
Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 101 (1991) (discussing the business judgment
rule deference to decisions of directors); Group of Inst. Investors v. Chicago,
Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad Co., 318 U.S. 523, 557 (1943) (deferring to the
business judgment of the commission); Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S.
288, 343 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (stating that courts may not interfere with
the management of a company, even if there is a mistake or bad business judgment).
220. The Supreme Court has recognized that certain rights that derive from the
Constitution are considered "fundamental" and are incorporated into the 14th
Amendment's Due Process Clause. The Court has held that statutes that concern
fundamental rights should be reviewed with strict scrutiny. See Anthony Ciccone, The
Constitutional Right To Vote Is Not A Duty, 23 Hamline J. Pub. L. & Pol'y 325, 328
(2002) (noting that fundamental rights are reviewed with strict scrutiny). Generally,
most of the bill of rights has been incorporated under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The exceptions are the Second and Third Amendments, the Fifth Amendment's
grand jury requirement, and the Seventh Amendment's rule regarding civil juries.
Akhil Reed Amar, 2000 Daniel J. Meador Lecture: Hugo Black and the Hall of Fame,
53 Ala. L. Rev. 1221, 1229-30 (2002).
221. See supra note 11.
222. See supra Part I.
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reason except one that is discriminatory.22 3 In a just cause situation,
the employer and employee contractually agree that the employee will
only be fired for just cause.224 It has been held that just cause means
that the
employer must show that the employee committed an act which
warrants his discharge. The employer must have a sound basis-a
reasonable ground-for his decision to terminate the employee. But
the employer does not have a reasonable ground if the225beliefs or
assumptions on which he bases his decision are incorrect.
Thus, generally complete accuracy of the employer's decision is
warranted for a firing.
This accuracy or reasonableness rule makes sense in just cause
contract cases. Here, the employer and employee have contracted
that the employee will only be terminated for certain reasons;
therefore, the reason would have to be accurate. Otherwise, the
employer would be able to subvert the contract and the employee's
job security. 22 6 The contract would mean nothing. In the employment
at will regime in which the honest belief rule functions, an employee
can be fired for any reason whatsoever as long as it is not
discriminatory.2 27 If the employer honestly believes that the employee
stole from the company, the employee can be fired even if the reason
is incorrect or unfair. 22 ' There is no contract that exists protecting the
employee's job. A reasonableness rule would incorrectly elevate
standards in an at will setting to be more in line with just cause.
B. Intrusioninto the Business Judgment of a Company
Generally the courts, whether advocates of the "pure" honest belief
rule or of the reasonableness rule, recognize an employer's right to
make its own business judgment, within reason.229
While the
223. See Befort, supra note 1.
224. Just cause "exists only by virtue of a mutual agreement between the employer
and employee, usually contained in a collective bargaining agreement, or as the result
of the acceptance by an employee of a unilateral offer made by an employer."
Sanders v. Parker Drilling Co., 911 F.2d 191, 199 (9th Cir. 1990).
225. Id. at 197.
226. Presumably, a unionized employee would be able to file a grievance based on
a lack of just cause and a non-unionized employee with an individual contract would
have an action for breach of contract. See, e.g., Amanda J. Berlowe, Comment,
Judicial Deference to Grievance Arbitration in the Private Sector: Saving Grace in the
Search for a Well-Defined Public Policy Exception, 42 U. Miami L. Rev. 767, 768
(1988) (explaining that employers typically agree to fire or discipline individuals for
"just cause," the union agrees not to strike and both parties agree to a grievance
procedure for bringing claims).
227. See Befort, supra note I and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
229. See, e.g., Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799, 807 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding
that courts should not attempt to "micro-manage" the process that was used); McCoy
v. WGN Cont'l Broad. Co., 957 F.2d 368, 373 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that the court
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"reasonableness" courts recognize this right, their inquiry goes too far.
Allowing court inquiry into the process that was used by an employer
and allowing that process to be subject to a reasonableness test
imposes the court's judgment on how the employer should run its
business and manage its employees."" While the courts might have to
be aware of the process used in order to compare the plaintiff to other
similarly-situated employees who are not alleging discrimination, they
do not have to judge the process nor make a determination that it was
unreasonable. Employers should not be subject to the judicial
determinations of the best way to conduct investigations or of the best
reasons to fire people." 1 This area has traditionally been left to the
expertise of businesspeople, who know their business, industry and
employees better than any court.232
The honest belief regime is adequate to protect employees rights in
this respect while at the same time respecting and protecting an
employer's business judgment. It ensures that the employer's reason
is one that is nondiscriminatory and protects the employer from
inquiry into the process they utilized to make their decision. While
the honest belief view has not been in existence for decades, the
courts that boast such a rule proclaim that they have "long
championed an employer's right to make its own business decisions,
'
even if they are wrong or bad."233
The judiciary's second-guessing of
business decisions could affect efficiency and profits. Businesses will
have to make more decisions in accordance with judicial resolution,
resulting in more uniformity of decision among businesses and greater
costs. While greater costs and uniformity are endemic to a business
administering anti-discrimination laws and policy in general, there
does not review business decisions).
230. See Jayne W. Barnard, The Securities Law Enforcement Remedies Act of 1989:
DisenfranchisingShareholdersin Order to Protect Them, 65 Notre Dame L. Rev. 32,
45 (1989) ("The very basis of the business judgment rule is the belief that corporate
executives have particularized expertise in dealing with business risks which judges do
not share.").
231. See Kralman v. Ill. Dep't of Veterans' Affairs, 23 F.3d 150, 156-57 (7th Cir.
1994) (stating that an employee will not win at the pretext stage by showing an
employer exhibited bad business judgment); Gregory S. Fisher, A Brief Analysis of
After-Acquired Evidence in Employment Cases: A Proposed Model for Alaska (and
Points South), 17 Alaska L. Rev. 271, 286 (2000) (explaining that courts are reluctant
to review management decisions); Ashley S. Heron, Comment, The Americans With
Disabilities Act: Who can Claim Its Protection?, 48 Ala. L. Rev. 1023, 1029 (1997)
(noting that "[an employer's business judgment as to production standards should
not be second- guessed" by the courts).
232. The business judgment rule is premised on the notion that fiduciaries owe a
duty of care to the company in which they work and therefore they should act in good
faith with reasonable care. The rule presumes that directors' decisions are honest,
well-intended, rational, and informed.
Therefore, courts should abstain from
reviewing such decisions. See Gina Marie Agresta-Richardson, Comment, Employee
Stock Ownership Plans: UncertaintiesPlaguing the Duties of the ESOP Fiduciary with
Respect to Voting and Defensive ESOPs, 14 Akron Tax J.91, 101-02 (1999).
23. Green v. Nat'l Steel Corp., 197 F.3d 894, 899 (7th Cir. 1999).
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should be a balancing of such effects with the goals of the laws. 2134
While under a "pure" honest belief regime an employer may incur
costs simply from litigating and implementing anti-discrimination
policy and subsequently incur some loss of decision making power,
under a reasonableness regime the employer will be troubled with
much greater costs and diminished power. This additional component
of reasonableness is not necessary for the discrimination laws to
function successfully, but businesspeople having control with minimal
judicial constraints is important for a business to function
successfully.235
Additionally, judicial regulation of employment, which is what
would amount if courts are going to analyze the reasonableness of
employers business decisions, is incompatible with the current regime
of employment at will where an employee can be fired for any reason
whether reasonable or not. 21 While the notion of employment at will
has diminished in recent years with the passage of these antidiscrimination laws, which some view as an express-exception to the
employment at will doctrine, it is still the predominant force in
employment throughout the nation.237
At will employment is
grounded in the notion that both the employer and employee can
terminate the employment relationship at any time with or without
cause. Requiring employment decisions to be based on a standard of
judicial reasonableness is repugnant to this notion and not necessary
to carry out the purpose of the anti-discrimination laws.
C. Policy Rationales
One rationale for adoption of the reasonableness regime, noted in
literature on this split, is that this reasonableness view is more in line
with the goals of the anti-discrimination acts. The goals, in general,
234. Employers have lost discretion in terms of their business decisions as a result
of the passage of the ADA. (This is also as a result of the other anti-discrimination
laws.) See Heron, supra note 231, at 1038.
235. The Supreme Court noted in Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661,675-76 (1994),
that there was a big concern for efficient employment decision making. The Court
noted that the employer would be forced to come to conclusions as would a jury later
on. Thus, the employer would have to concern itself with things such as hearsay and
make conclusions based on what later would be admissible in court. This would be a
burden on the employer, considering that employers often rely on complaints made
by customers and other employee's to make their decisions which is in essence
reliance on hearsay. Id. at 676. Noted theorist Richard Epstein argues in favor of a
freedom to contract regime. He believes that the exceptions to employment at will,
including the discrimination laws, make the current legal climate too complex and add
needless administrative costs to the overall costs of doing business and create poor
incentives. Macdonald & Beck-Dudley, supra note 4, at 375.
236. See supra Part I.
237. See Befort, supra note 1. While the anti-discrimination laws are an exception
to at will employment, individuals can still hold employment at will subject to the
provisions of the anti-discrimination laws.
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are to prevent employment actions based on "unfounded fear,
prejudice, ignorance, or mythologies. '238 It is argued that a "pure"
honest belief, without a requirement of reasonableness, is based on
this prejudice and fear.239 Thus, requiring the employer's actions to be
reasonable would prohibit an employer from making decisions based
on stereotypes because the employer would have to point to
particularized facts. 24" However, an important goal of the acts was to
ensure that there was not discrimination against protected
individuals. 24' Equal opportunity and treatment of those in protected
classes was the objective.2 42 It does not follow that these protected
individuals should be afforded greater protection than individuals not
protected under the anti-discrimination laws. 243 These non-protected
individuals cannot benefit from the reasonableness inquiry that
protected individuals would be afforded in an employment at will
regime. 244
The honest belief regime adequately protects against stereotypes,
because the honest belief relates to a legitimate reason for the firing.
For example, in Green v. National Steel, Green was fired because her
employer honestly believed she was falsifying personnel records, had
removed company property and worked unauthorized overtime.245
Even if their belief was not true, it does not follow that their reason
was a discriminatory one and based on a stereotype of disabled
people. While there is an argument that the employer is more lax
with investigating those who are disabled which would indicate
discrimination, reasonableness is not the only way to examine this
possibility. The employee can offer evidence that other similarly
situated individuals, not of her protected class, were investigated
differently concerning similar allegations. 246 This evidence directly
rebuts the honesty of the employer's reason. If an employer usually
investigates theft in a certain way and then in one instance fails to
complete half of the investigation, then this might probe the honesty
of the employer's belief. If on the other hand, the employer always
completes an unreasonable investigation, this would not be evidence
that the belief is not honest.
238. Atchley, supra note 89, at 237.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. See supra note 11.
242. See supra note 11.
243. See supra note 19 for a discussion of who is protected under the acts.
244. See supra Part I for a discussion of the requirements to sue under one of the
three discrimination statutes. Since only those in protected classes may sue, those not
in protected classes must just accept the personnel action they have suffered and may
not benefit from a court inquiring into the reasonableness of the employer's belief for
its action.
245. Green v. Nat'l Steel Corp., 197 F.3d 894, 896-97 (7th Cir. 1999). See supra
Part II.A for a discussion.
246. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
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Further, judicial efficiency is an important consideration. Many
discrimination claims lack merit, and the summary judgment stage
becomes an appropriate place to rid the docket of these meritless
cases. 241 Summary judgment is a "useful tool for promoting judicial
efficiency... in the employment context. ' 24' Employing the "pure"
honest belief regime requires the employee to meet his burden and
establish some factual issue, whether it is about the honesty of the
belief or facts indicating discrimination (whether direct or indirect).249
However, if the reasonableness regime were adopted many meritless
cases would survive summary judgment because the employee would
be able to create a material issue of fact based on the reasonableness
of the employer's decision.
While some believe that summary
judgment should not be utilized as often as it is because it prevents
individuals from exercising their right to trial, the courts are heavily
overloaded with cases."' Summary judgment enables courts to decide
cases without the cost and time of a trial. Of course, a court would not
grant summary judgment if it were not warranted and there was a
dispute over a factual issue. 2 Therefore, the honest belief rule allows
the court to ferret out cases in which the employee can offer no facts
which point to pretext.
CONCLUSION

Consider Mary's case once again. She has no evidence to show that
she was terminated for a discriminatory reason. She just believes this
is so because she has not been late and perhaps she wants someone to
blame. Her supervisor, on the other hand, did a shoddy investigation
and could have asked Mary's team worker about her lateness, but just
247. According to McAninch, "[Jemployment discrimination claims and civil rights

claims comprised 0.4% of the federal circuit court caseload in 1964. By 1986, 6.8% of
all litigation was employment litigation." McAninch, supra note 99, at 949. The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") reported in 2002 that 84,442
charges were filed under Title VII, the ADA, the ADEA, and the Equal Pay Act. Of

those filed charges, the EEOC determined that 59.3% did not have reasonable cause
and only 7.2% did have reasonable cause. The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission,

All

Statutes,

available

at

http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/all.html

(last

modified Feb. 6, 2003). The EEOC reports are based on charges filed with the EEOC
as a precondition to litigation. See supra note 14.

248. McAninch, supra note 99, at 962.
249. See supra Part 11.A.
250. See supra Part l.B.

251. In fact, some jurisdictions do not treat employment discrimination cases onl a
summary judgment motion the same as other cases being decided on a summary
judgment motion. Though there appears no reason to give plaintiffs in discrimination
cases preferential treatment. If a court properly determines whether there is an issue

of fact, then there is no need for preferential treatment. Some courts cite the trouble

with the intent element of' a discrimination case as a reason not to favor summary
judgment when appropriate. See McAninch, supra note 99, at 956. If intent is at issue
the case should proceed to trial because this is a question of fact.

252. See supra note 98.
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because she did not, does not mean that her actions were
discriminatory. Mary was hired at Titlemen with a disability and had
worked there for a long time. Therefore, Mary will most likely not
survive summary judgment in an honest belief regime.
In a
reasonableness regime, however, the court might find that Titlemen's
investigation was inadequate and allow Mary to proceed with her
case. Therefore, Mary would survive summary judgment without any
evidence pointing to discrimination and without rebutting the honesty
of the belief of the employer, in essence, without showing pretext in
accordance with the third prong of the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine
test.
A "pure" honest belief regime is more consistent with the
evidentiary burdens established by the Court, the Court's
jurisprudence in other areas of the law, autonomy of business
decisions and notions of judicial efficiency.
While the antidiscrimination laws are perhaps the most important laws passed in the
twentieth century, it is important to remember the context of the laws
and the regime in which they function. They function in a workplace
that has been traditionally non-regulated and has recently come into
regulation. It is easy to become subsumed with the rights of the
employee because they are traditionally weaker. However, to keep an
appropriate balance one must consider the employer's rights and not
become captivated with the rights of the employee. Both the
employee and the employer are adequately protected by an honest
belief regime.

Notes & Observations

